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Abstract
Individual moral hazard engendered by health insurance and monopolistic pro-
duction are both typical phenomena of drug markets. We develop a simple model
containing these two elements and show that private agents tend to overinsure
themselves against health respectively drug expenses if drugs can be produced at
low marginal costs. If marginal costs are negligible, health insurance should be
abandoned at all.
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1. Introduction
Conventional health insurance, as available on private insurance markets, typ-
ically links insurance benets to the costs of health care services incurred by the
insured. It is well known that such insurance contracts induce the insured to ex-
cessively consume health care services in case of illness. The negative eciency
impact of this behavior, known as ex-post moral hazard, has received extensive
consideration in the health economics literature.
1
It was Feldstein (1970, 1973)
who rst pointed out that moral hazard not only triggers an excessive demand
for health care services but may also lead to higher prices in health care mar-
kets. These price eects, however, are not taken into account by the households
when purchasing health insurance. Employing data of US health care markets,
Feldstein showed that US households on average purchase too much health insur-
ance. Reducing health insurance coverage would increase consumer welfare since
the benets of lower prices for health care services would outweigh the welfare
losses due to higher risk taking.
2
Building on the studies of Feldstein, Chiu (1997)
recently showed that in case of a complete price-inelastic supply of health care
services conventional health care insurance should be entirely abandoned.
The approaches of Feldstein and Chiu rest on the assumption of an exoge-
nously given supply function of health care services. Basically, the adverse welfare
eects of an increased demand for health care services are due to a low elasticity
of its supply. In the present paper we emphasize a dierent argument for excess
insurance in private health insurance markets. Instead of considering a given sup-
ply function of health care services, we start out from the observation that real
world health care markets are, to a large extend, characterized by considerable
market power on the supply side. Especially the markets for prescription drugs
are dominated by rms being endowed with far-reaching patent protection that
guarantees monopolistic positions in particular drug markets. Moreover, there is
substantial empirical evidence for serious moral hazard with respect to prescription
drugs engendered by insurance.
3
In this paper we consider a model whose ingredients are moral hazard with
1
See, e.g., Arrow (1968), Pauly (1968, 1974), and Zeckhauser (1970).
2
See also Feldman and Dowd (1991) for a more recent empirical estimation of the
welfare loss of excessive health insurance.
3
See, e.g., Coulson and Stuart (1995).
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respect to drug consumption arising from insurance and a drug market dominated
by a single monopolistic producer. First, we analyze the relationship between
the monopolistic price for drugs and the extend to which households purchase
insurance. We show that the price for drugs increases with insurance coverage if
the marginal costs of the monopolist are rather low. Subsequently, we show that
in case of small marginal costs individuals purchase an ineciently high amount
of health insurance coverage. If the monopolist faces negligible marginal costs, it
is even optimal for consumers not to purchase insurance at all.
Our analysis also implies a redinition of the public role in health insurance.
Even though public health insurance is not able to overcome the moral hazard
problem as such, a compulsory health insurance scheme with higher than market
coinsurance rates reduces drug prices and increases consumer welfare.
2. The Model
We consider an economy with a large number of identical individuals with
unit measure. A representative individual has a propability  2 (0; 1) of getting
sick. In case of illness the individual suers a loss which can be reduced by the
consumption of a drug. The individual has the opportunity to purchase insurance
to reduce the drug costs in case of illness. Expected utility is given by:
EU =  u(Y   z   L(X)   pX) + (1  )u(Y   z); (1)
where u denotes a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with u
0
> 0 and
u
00
< 0, Y is the individual's disposable income, z is the insurance premium, X is
the quantity of the drug consumed in case of illness, p is the price of the drug, and
 is the coinsurance rate chosen by the individual. L(X) denotes the monetary
loss suered by the individual in case of illness. The loss L can be reduced by
drug consumption. The function L() is assumed to be three times continuously
dierentiable and we further assume:
L > 0; L
0
< 0; L
0
(0) =  1; and L
00
> 0; (2)
implying that the marginal reduction of the loss the individual suers when sick
is decreasing. On the assumption that the loss L is private information of sick
individuals, a contract between the insurer and the insured cannot depend on
the monetary loss L. Instead, only the drug costs in case of illness pX can be
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subject of an insurance contract. We restrict ourselves to linear insurance contracts
implying that the insurer reimburses a constant share of drug costs.
4
We assume
risk neutral insurers. Under perfect competiton only insurance contracts will be
traded which imply residual prots of zero:
z =  (1  ) pX: (3)
In contrast, the drug is supplied by a monopolistic producer. We assume that the
drug is produced with constant marginal costs c. Furthermore, the supply of the
drug requires xed costs F . Therefore, the monopolist's prot may be written as:
G =  (p  c)X   F: (4)
The sequence of events is as follows: In the rst period, individuals choose an in-
surance contract given by the bundle (z; ). In the second period, the monopolist
chooses a price for the drug. In the third period, nature decides which individuals
become sick and which individuals stay healthy. Finally, in the fourth period, in-
dividuals choose the drug quantity. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure
1. Note, that because of the large number of individuals, the single individual's
insurance choice has no inuence on the pricing decision of the monopolist. Conse-
quently, all the results derived below would not change, if we considered a sequence
of events in which the individuals and the monopolist move simultaneously in the
rst stage. However, if the monopolist set the drug price before the individuals
undertake their insurance decision, he would have the opportunity to strategically
inuence the insurance decision of the individuals.
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Period
1 2 3 4
Individuals choose
insurance contract
Monopolist chooses
drug price
Nature chooses
state of health
Individuals choose
drug quantity
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
4
Linear contracts allow for a simple treatment of the moral hazard problem. More
sophisticated contracts, as discussed, for example, in Spence and Zeckhauser (1971)
and Blomqvist (1997), would not alter the character of the results derived in this
paper.
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3. Insurance and Drug Market Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the insurance and drug market will be determined by back-
ward induction. To start with, we determine the quantity of drugs demanded by
the representative individual. Considering equation (1), a healthy individual will
not consume any drugs, whereas a sick individual solves the following optimization
problem:
max
X0
u(Y   z   L(X)   pX):
Assuming the disposable income Y to be suciently high, the rst-order condition
is given by:
 L
0
   p = 0: (5)
Equation (5) implies that only insurance contracts with a positive coinsurance rate
are traded in private insurance markets. A fully insured individual would expand
his demand for drugs innitely. This would imply insurance premiums to rise to
innity, too. Obviously, such an insurance is not feasible.
As shown by equation (5), in the optimum the marginal reduction of the
monetary loss achieved by extra drug consumption equals the marginal personal
costs of drugs. Equation (5) implies a demand function of the form X(p; ).
Employing the implicit function rule, it follows:
@X
@
=  
p
L
00
< 0; (6)
@X
@p
=  

L
00
< 0: (7)
Choosing the drug price, the monopolist will take the individual demand function
X(; p) into account. Thus, the monopolist solves:
max
p
 (p  c)X(; p)  F:
When the monopolist chooses the drug price, the coinsurance rate  is already
xed. Hence, the rst-order condition for maximum prot is given by:
(p  c)
@X(; p)
@p
+X(; p) = 0: (8)
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We assume that the prot maximizing price is strictly positive for all c including
c = 0. Equation (8) implies that the prot maximizing price p is a function of the
coinsurance rate . Implicit dierentiation yields:
dp
d
=
 (p  c)
@
2
X
@p @
 
@X
@
(p  c)
@
2
X
@p
2
+ 2
@X
@p
: (9)
Considering the second-order condition for a prot maximum of the monopolist,
the denominator of the right hand side of equation (9) is negative. In contrast, the
sign of the numerator is ambiguous. The following lemma, however, shows that
the sign of the numerator and, henceforth, the sign of dp=d can be determined
for low marginal costs c.
Lemma 1: There is some c > 0, so that for all c < c it follows: dp=d < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
To get an intuition for this result, it is helpful to consider rst, how the
equilibrium quantity for drugs X depends on the coinsurance rate. Considering
equations (6), (7), and (9), X can in fact be written as a function of . The total
eect of an increase of  on X is as follows.
Lemma 2: dX=d  0, with = 0 if c = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, if c = 0, moral hazard of the insured does not lead to higher drug
consumption in equilibrium. From (6) we know that an increase in the coinsur-
ance rate leads to a decrease in the demand for drugs. Facing this decrease in
demand, the monopolist can generally adjust both price and quantity. However, if
marginal costs are equal to zero, the monopolist gains nothing by simply reducing
the quantity. Consequently, it will be more eective to lower the price. A similar
argument can be applied if marginal costs are positive but small, since in all these
cases a quantity reduction has only a minor eect on costs.
This result allows a comparison with the work of Chiu (1997). There, the
assumption of a complete price-inelastic supply of health care which is justied by
the role of nonmarket factors leads to an inexibility of consumed health care with
respect to the coinsurance rate . Here, in contrast, the interplay between moral
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hazard and monopolistic prot maximization results in an equilibrium quantity of
drugs which is independent of the coinsurance rate when marginal costs are zero.
In period one, the representative individual will choose out of the set of all fair
insurance contracts the one that maximizes his expected utility. Doing this, the
individual takes into account his demand for drugs in case of illness as implicitly
dened by equation (5). Because of the large number of individuals the choice of
insurance of one individual does not inuence the pricing decision of the monop-
olist. Consequently, the single individual takes the drug price as xed. Therefore,
the optimization problem in the rst period can be written as:
max
0<1
 u[Y    (1  ) pX(; p)  L(X(; p))   pX(; p)]
+ (1  )u[Y    (1  ) pX(; p)]:
The rst-order condition is given by:
  (1  ) pX (u
0
s
  u
0
h
)   (1  ) p
@X
@
[ u
0
s
+(1  )u
0
h
]  0;
with = 0; if  < 1; (10)
where u
0
s
and u
0
h
denote marginal utility in case of illness and health, respec-
tively. Condition (10) describes the trade-o between additional utility resulting
from reduced risk and additional utility resulting from a lower insurance premium.
Condition (10) implies that the representative individual chooses a strictly positive
amount of insurance ( < 1). To see this suppose, on the contrary, that  = 1.
Then the rst term of the left hand side of condition (10) is negative, because in
the absence of insurance marginal utility in case of illness is larger than in case of
health, while the second term is equal to zero. This, however, is a contradiction to
condition (10). Thus, for the optimal , denoted as 

below, 0 < 

< 1 holds.
5
Hence, the equilibrium of the economy under consideration is characterized by
the insurance contract (

; z(

)), the drug price p(

), and the quantity of drugs
X(

; p(

)).
4. Choice of Insurance and Individual Welfare
In this section we address the question whether or not the individually chosen
5
A similar result is derived in Zeckhauser (1970), Blomqvist (1991), and Chiu (1997).
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coinsurance rate 

maximizes individual welfare. Therefore, we examine how a
marginal change in the coinsurance rate will eect the individual's expected utility
when  equals 

. Dierentiation of (1), while considering (3) and (10), yields:
dEU
d
j
=

=   (1  

)

dp
d
X + p
@X
@p
dp
d

[ u
0
s
+ (1  )u
0
h
]
   

dp
d
X u
0
s
: (11)
Equation (11) indicates that a marginal change of the individually chosen coin-
surance rate inuences the welfare of the representative individual only via price
eects but not via quantity eects. When choosing the insurance contract, the
individual considers the quantitative moral hazard eect on his drug demand, but
has no incentive to internalize its price eect. Generally, the price eect inuences
consumer welfare in two ways. It aects expected utility by altering the insurance
premium [rst term of the right hand side of equation (11)] and by altering the
individual drug costs in case of illness [second term of the right hand side of equa-
tion (11)]. Considering the rst-order condition of the monopolist (8), the price
eect can be broken down in a premium eect and a drug cost eect.
dEU
d
j
=

=  (1  

) c
@X
@p
[ u
0
s
+ (1  )u
0
h
]
dp
d
| {z }
premium eect
  

X u
0
s
dp
d
| {z }
drug cost eect
: (12)
Considering Lemma 1, we know, that dp=d < 0 holds if the marginal costs of drug
production are rather low. Consequently, equation (12) states a negative premium
eect and a positive drug cost eect if c is small. It turns out, however, that the
drug cost eect always dominates the premium eect. Therefore, the overall eect
of an increase in the coinsurance rate on expected utility can be related to the
level of marginal costs so that the following result obtains.
Proposition 1: The individuals choose an ineciently low coinsurance rate  if
c < c.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Considering Lemmata 1 and 2, we know, that for c = 0 a variation of the
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coinsurance rate implies only a change in the price of the drug but does not imply
a change in the equilibrium drug consumption. Therefore, a lower coinsurance rate
only changes the monopolistic prot, whereas the individual drug costs in case
of illness,  pX, remain unchanged. Equation (5) clearly shows that with drug
consumption xed a reduction of the coinsurance rate leads to an equi-proportional
rise in the drug price. In the end, the individual pays a higher insurance premium
but faces the same risk of drug expenditure. Consequently, any insurance leads to
a welfare loss if c = 0. This result will also hold for c suciently small, because,
considering our assumptions about L(), dX=d is continuous in c. Therefore, we
receive the following result:
Proposition 2: There is some

c
2 (0; c], so that the individuals should choose a
coinsurance rate of 1 for all c <

c
.
A straightforward implication of Propositions 1 and 2 is that a compulsory
health insurance scheme might be superior to market health insurance. Depending
on marginal costs of drug production, such a scheme should imply higher than
market coinsurance rates for drug expenses or should even exclude them at all.
5. Concluding Remarks
In the present paper we have shown that households purchase excessive in-
surance if the drugs that they need in case of illness are supplied on monopolistic
markets and if these drugs are produced at low marginal costs. Consequently, the
question arises whether these characteristics in fact prevail in drug markets.
Monopoly power in the drug market can be attributed to patent protection.
Patents are commonly used to induce private rms to meet the enormous costs of
developing drugs. It could be argued that patent protection for drugs does not lead
to the establishment of pure monopolies because for most patented drugs more or
less close substitutes are available. Nevertheless, at least patents granted recently
provide substantial scope for setting prices above marginal costs since otherwise
producers would avoid the costs of patent application. It is this price setting power
which drives our results. Moreover, even pure monopolies can be found in drug
markets as, for instance, the drug for erectile dysfunction Viagra.
Drugs protected by patents account for a signicant share of drug markets in
all developed countries indicating the importance of price setting power in these
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markets. In Germany, for example, patent protected drugs that have been intro-
duced since 1985 reached a revenue of 6 billion deutschmarks in 1996 which means
a share of 17.4% of the entire drug market.
6
The second condition for overinsurance in private markets derived in this pa-
per also seems to be quite plausible. The major part of the costs a drug producer
incurs arises during the phase of developing the drug. For instance, the devel-
opment of a drug until its introduction into the market lasts 12 to 15 years on
average and the probability that a particular synthesized substance in fact leads
to a marketable drug is about 0.01%.
7
Our results suggest that introducing compulsory public health insurance may
have a positive eect on consumer welfare if the public health insurance exhibits
lower insurance coverage for drugs protected by patents than individuals choose on
private markets. It is a well known fact that public health insurance is not able to
remove the moral hazard problem as such, because it faces the same information
constraints as private insurance. Nevertheless, in contrast to the single individual,
government can internalize the price increasing eects of moral hazard and can
help to overcome the following prisoner's dilemma. Individuals would be better
o if coinsurance rates were higher, but every single individual has an incentive
to purchase more insurance than socially optimal. Such a role of public health
insurance, however, would require that households were not allowed to purchase
additional health insurance in private markets.
In the present paper we have only analyzed how consumer welfare is aected
by health care insurance. We have not considered how monopoly rents are altered
by a change in health care coverage and the possible repercussions on individual
welfare. Generally, a change in monopoly prots aects the welfare of shareholders
in the drug industry and, in this way, has a redistributional impact. The consid-
eration of redistributive aspects, however, would render any welfare conclusions
rather dicult.
6
See Schwabe (1997).
7
See Bartling and Hadamit (1982), Walker and Parrish (1988), and Weisbrod (1991).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Considering (9), we can write dp=d = N=D, with:
N =  (p  c)
@
2
X
@p @
 
@X
@
; (A:1)
D = (p  c)
@
2
X
@p
2
+ 2
@X
@p
: (A:2)
Because p is the prot maximzing price of the monopolist, the respective second-
order condition implies D < 0. Furthermore, dierentiation of (6) and (7) yields:
@
2
X
@p
2
=  

2
L
000
L
00
3
=
@
2
X
@p @

p
 
1
p
@X
@p
: (A:3)
Considering (A.3), (6), and (7), straightforward manipulation of (A.2) leads to:
D =  

p

 (p  c)
@
2
X
@p @
 

1 +
c
p

@X
@

< 0: (A:4)
Substituting into (A.1) yields:
N =  
p

D +
c
p
@X
@
: (A:5)
Since, by assumption, p is strictly positive for c = 0, drug demand X(; p) is nite
for c = 0, and Lemma 1 follows with a standard continuity argument. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Considering (6), (7), (A.1) and (A.2), we nd:
dX
d
=
@X
@
+
@X
@p
dp
d
=  
pD + N
L
00
D
: (A:6)
Furthermore, from (A.5) we get:
D =  

p
N +
 c
p
2
@X
@
: (A:7)
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Finally, considering (A.6), (A.7), (6), and D < 0, yields:
dX
d
=
 c
L
00
2
D
 0; with = 0 if c = 0: Q :E :D : (A:8)
Proof of Proposition 1
Straightforward manipulation of (10) while considering (6), (7) and 0 < 

<
1 yields:
(1  

)
@X
@p
[ u
s
+ (1  )u
0
h
] =  


p
(1  )X (u
0
s
  u
0
h
): (A:9)
Substituting into (12) leads to:
dEU
d
j=

=   

X
1
p
[(p  (1  ) c)u
0
s
+ (1  ) c u
0
h
]
dp
d
: (A:10)
Since p > (1  ) c, the proposition follows with Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
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